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Abstract in English 
The dynamic effects from EU membership are crucial for the new member states to catch up 
with the average income level in the old member states. To gauge the dynamic effects, we 
follow a two-step procedure in which a gravity equation for bilateral trade shows the trade 
effect of EU membership and a growth regression yields the income effect of trade. Shared EU 
membership is found to increase trade between two of its member states with about 34%. EU 
membership may contribute to trade by inducing countries to improve the quality of their 
institutions. Trade increases by another 22% if institutions improve, yielding a total trade 
increase of 56%. Improved openness increases income by 37.5% according to our estimates. 
Adding a small direct effect of improved institutions on income, the total income effect of EU 
membership is 39% for the ten new members. This implies that EU membership, or its effect on 
trade and institutions, could lead to large economic gains for the new member states, but does 
not bring them economically on par with the old member states. 
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Abstract in Dutch 
De dynamische effecten van het EU-lidmaatschap zijn cruciaal voor de nieuwe lidstaten om 
naar het gemiddelde inkomen van de oude lidstaten toe te groeien. Voor een kwantitatieve 
invulling van de dynamische effecten volgen we een twee-stapsmethode. We gebruiken een 
graviteitsvergelijking voor bilaterale handel om het handelseffect van EU-lidmaatschap te 
bepalen. Daarnaast schatten we een groeivergelijking om het inkomenseffect van meer handel 
te duiden. Gedeeld EU-lidmaatschap vergroot de handel tussen twee lidstaten met ongeveer 
34%. EU-lidmaatschap kan ook de kwaliteit van de instituties in landen stimuleren. Als deze 
instituties verbeteren, neemt de handel met 22% toe, zodat het totale handelseffect 56% 
bedraagt. Deze handelstoename kan het inkomen met 38% doen toenemen volgens onze 
schattingen. Met een klein direct effect van verbeterde instituties op groei is het totale 
inkomenseffect 39%. Dit betekent dat EU-lidmaatschap, via het effect op handel en instituties, 
tot grote economische voordelen voor de nieuwe lidstaten kan leiden, maar dat brengt ze nog 
niet op het inkomensniveau van de oude lidstaten.  
 
Steekwoorden: inkomen en openheid, EU-toetreding, graviteitsvergelijking 
 
Een uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting is beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl.   4   5 
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Summary 
In May 2004, the European Union expanded by 10 countries: eight countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) and Cyprus and Malta. This was the largest expansion in the history of 
the European Union. For the eight countries, this marked the end of their transition from a 
centrally planned economy and a one-party system towards a market economy and a democratic 
structure.  
Many in the new member states, and also in the candidate countries Bulgaria, Rumania, and 
Turkey, hope that EU membership will pave the way towards economic prosperity. In 2001, 
income per capita in the ten new member states was about 45% of the EU-15 average 
(measured in purchasing power terms). The income gap is larger than it was with earlier 
entrants, like Ireland, Portugal and Spain. More importantly, from the perspective of the new 
member states and the candidate countries, these earlier entrants have fared pretty well after 
their accession. Production per capita in Ireland is now one of the highest in European Union. 
The central question is whether European integration does indeed stimulate catching up of 
the new member states and will indeed reduce the income differences. The economic literature 
does not deliver a clear-cut answer. The studies fall roughly into two categories. The studies in 
the first category derive from simulations the gains of the economic integration of EU 
membership. Typically, the gains are static. The most recent studies predict an average income 
effect for Central and Eastern Europe that is more than 7% of GDP. Of course, this effect is 
notable. But clearly, it is not nearly enough to close the income gap between new and old 
member states. 
 The studies in the second category use regression analysis to gauge the overall effect of EU 
membership on income (growth).  These studies take implicitly also account of the dynamic 
gains of trade such as better integrated capital markets, larger FDI flows or the dynamic effects 
of integrated product markets. Also, international trade in goods and services may facilitate the 
transfer of ideas and technologies and in this way contribute to higher productivity (growth). 
We reconsider the effect on EU membership on economic growth, with a particular focus on 
the productivity gains of integrating national markets into the European internal market. We 
employ a two-step procedure, following Frankel and Rose (2002). First, an estimated gravity 
equation for bilateral trade yields that EU membership contributes to trade, mainly among the 
member states. Second, trade openness is estimated to contribute to production (growth), in line 
with the results of a vast empirical literature on the link between the two. The two-step 
procedure has the important advantage that it allows us to empirically identify the effect of EU 
membership. The procedure uses the variation across bilateral trade flows (the gravity equation) 
and uses the variation over time (the growth regression) to identify the link from EU 
membership via trade openness to production growth.  
Institutional change is another important aspect of the EU integration. North (1990), for 
example, argues that institutions (in a broad sense) reduce uncertainty which in turn lowers   8 
transaction costs and contributes positively to economic performance. In all accession countries 
EU membership serves as an external anchor for institutional change (e.g. stronger protection of 
property rights). Introducing measures for institutional quality reduces the effect of EU 
membership on trade flows and the effect of openness on growth, but does not annihilate these 
effects. So, there are two relevant channels through which the accession countries are likely to 
benefit from EU membership. First, joining the internal market increases their opportunities to 
trade and raises their growth potential. Second, improving their institutions to meet EU 
requirements has - directly and indirectly - a positive impact on their growth potential.  
The empirical results support optimism for the new member states. First, EU membership is 
estimated to increase trade with roughly 56%. The effects for the individual CEE countries vary 
widely. To a large extent this variation depends on a country’s openness in combination with 
the intensity of its trade with the EU and on the quality of the institutions. Second, a one 
percentage point increase in openness, i.e. the ratio of trade to GDP, expands output by about 
0.7% in the long run. Combining the two effects, the new EU members can experience on 
average an increase in their real income of roughly 39% in the long term. These results show 
that EU integration could significantly help in reducing the income gap between new and old 
member states. Relative income in the accession countries could increase from 46 to 63% of the 
EU-15 average. That is a significant decline of the income gap, although much remains to be 
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1  Introduction
1 
In May 2004, eight countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), along with Cyprus and 
Malta, joined the European Union. This was the largest expansion in the history of the 
European Union, and reunited a continent that was split for almost half a century by the Iron 
Curtain. For the eight countries this marked their transition from a centrally planned economy 
and a one-party system towards a market economy and a democratic structure. The enthusiasm 
in these countries was large in referendums voters approved entry by large margins, fuelled not 
only by political reasons but also by economic expectations.  
Many in the new member states, and also in the candidate countries Bulgaria, Rumania and 
Turkey, hope that EU membership will pave the way towards economic prosperity. In 2001 
income per capita in the ten new member states was about 45% of the EU-15 average 
(measured in purchasing power terms). For the three candidate countries the gap with the EU 
average is even larger. The income gap is larger than it was with earlier entrants, like Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain. More importantly, from the perspective of the new member states and the 
candidate countries, these earlier entrants have fared pretty well after their accession. 
Production per capita in Ireland is now one of the highest in European Union. Measured in 
purchasing power terms, Spain has also increased its production per capita from 74% in 1986 to 
84% in 2001 of the EU-15 average, and Portugal has increased it from 62% to 75% in the same 
period. 
The enthusiasm in the new and candidate member states is not fully shared in the old 
member states. Political considerations have largely driven the process of shifting the Union’s 
border to the East. The income differences, however, give rise to several concerns. The first is 
that the income differences translate into different political priorities. The increased 
heterogeneity may hinder policy making at the European level. For example, the new and 
candidate member states could very well be less interested in pursuing climate change policies 
than the old member states. Second, the income differences may also give rise to (large) 
migration flows from new to the old member states. Third, the large income differences exert an 
upward pressure on the EU budget and give new impetus to discussions about the allocation of 
funds across member states. Of course, these concerns depend on the economic performance of 
the new member states after their accession. The concerns will become less when (the prospect 
of) accession proves to be the starting point for fast catching-up toward the average income in 
the EU-15.  
The EU countries both new and old thus hope for economic prosperity in the new member 
states. The central, important question is whether European integration does indeed stimulate 
catching up of the new member states and will indeed reduce the income differences. 
 
 
1 We gratefully acknowledge comments by George Gelauff, Volker Nitsch and Theo van de Klundert.   10 
The economic literature does not deliver a clear-cut answer. The studies fall roughly into two 
categories. The studies in the first category derive from simulations the gains of the economic 
integration of EU membership. Typically, the gains are static. The studies in the second 
category use regression analysis to gauge the overall effect of EU membership on income 
(growth). Table 1.1 presents the results from studies in the first category. Models are simulated 
to calculate the effects of removing trade barriers between the national goods and services 
markets. Some of the studies only take account of (the elimination of) the trade taxes between 
countries. Other studies also consider a decrease in non-tariff barriers following from joining 
the internal market. This decrease in real trade costs follows from, among other things, abolition 
of administrative barriers (i.e. no waiting time at borders, less formalities, etc.) and elimination 
of many technical barriers (through mutual recognition of technical standards, harmonization of 
rules and regulations, minimum requirements). Furthermore, risk and uncertainty will diminish 
since EU membership constrains arbitrary changes in trade policies (Baldwin et al. 1997), 
which will make decision making of economic agents easier. Table 1.1 gives the impression 
that more recent studies turn up with more pronounced effects. One reason might be that over 
time researchers find better ways to approximate non-tariff barriers. Breus (2001) and Lejour et 
al. (2004) predict an average income effect for Central and Eastern Europe that is more than 7% 
of GDP. Of course, this effect is notable. But clearly, it is not nearly enough to close the income 
gap between new and old member states. It implies that income in the accession countries rises 
from 45% to only 48% of the EU-15 average (Lejour and Nahuis, 2004). That model 
simulations do not predict full or significant convergence, follows from the focus on the static 
gains of trade. They overlook for example the effects of better integrated capital markets, larger 
FDI flows or the dynamic effects of integrated product markets. Also, international trade in 
goods and services may facilitate the transfer of ideas and technologies and in this way 
contribute to higher productivity (growth).
2 
Table 1.1  Static gains of EU enlargement on GDP with CGE models 
  Effect on EU-15  Effect on CEE countries 
     
Baldwin et al. (1997)  0.2  1.5 
Brown et al. (1997)  0.1  3.8 
European Commission (2001)  0.2-0.4  n.a. 
Lejour et al. (2004)  0.1  7.8 
Breuss (2001)  0.2  7.2 
 
The second category of papers uses regression analysis to directly estimate the effect of EU 
membership on economic growth. This does not confine the gains from membership to 
improvements in allocative efficiency, but rather considers the overall effect on production 
(growth). Henrekson et al. (1997) use panel data for 23 OECD countries and 5 time periods 
 
2 See for example Coe and Helpman (1995) and Griffith, Redding and Reenen (2000).   11 
between 1970 and 1990 to establish the effect of EU and EFTA membership on economic 
growth per capita. They derive that EU membership raises economic growth for a long time by 
about 0.6% to 0.8% per year. The results are not always robust for alternative specifications of 
the regression. With a similar data set Vanhoudt (1998) did not find a permanent growth effect 
of EU accession. Badinger (2005) argues even that a large part of the trade integration does not 
follow from EU membership, but is the result of successful trade negotiations in the GATT and 
WTO. 
Two studies also look into particular aspects of EU membership that may have an impact on 
economic growth. Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2002) focus only on the EU countries. They come 
up with the result that the duration of EU membership has a positive effect on GDP growth per 
capita. Crafts and Kaser (2004) stress, on the other hand, the importance of the rule of law for 
the CEE countries and their economic performance. They include in a growth regression a 
measure for the rule of law. Crafts and Kaser conclude that economic growth per capita in the 
CEE countries (including Bulgaria and Rumania, excluding Cyprus and Malta) can be about 4% 
in the medium term, if they move to EU standards of good governance. 
3 
 
In this paper we reconsider the effect on EU membership on economic growth, with a particular 
focus on the productivity gains of integrating national markets into the European internal 
market. We employ a two-step procedure, following Frankel and Rose (2002). First, an 
estimated gravity equation for bilateral trade yields that EU membership contributes to trade, 
mainly among the member states. Second, trade openness is estimated to contribute to 
production (growth), in line with the results of a vast empirical literature on the link between 
the two. The two-step procedure has the important advantage that it allows us to empirically 
identify the effect of EU membership. Changes in membership do not occur often. It is hardly 
surprising that a dummy for EU membership in the growth regression turns to be statistically 
insignificant. Instead, the procedure uses the variation across bilateral trade flows (the gravity 
equation) and uses the variation over time (the growth regression) to identify the link from EU 
membership via trade openness to production growth.  
Institutional change is another important aspect of the EU integration. North (1990), for 
example, argues that institutions (in a broad sense) reduce uncertainty which in turn lowers 
transaction costs and contributes positively to economic performance. In all accession countries 
EU membership serves as an external anchor for institutional change (e.g. stronger protection of 
property rights). De Melo et al. (1992) talk about a tendency towards institutional convergence.  
Indeed, recent empirical literature supports a positive link between the quality of institutions 
and economic growth.
4 Rodrik and Subramanian (2003) even claim that institutions trump 
 
3 Using a growth-accounting exercise they also show that these growth rates are only possible by sufficient TFP and capital 
growth. Given the projected population and labour force developments, and participation rates, labour growth will probably 
be negative in the coming decades. 
4 See for example Hall and Jones (1999), Knack and Keefer (1995), Acemoglu et al. (2003), Easterly and Levine (2003), 
Kaufman et al. (2003).   12 
everything else in explaining growth. Empirical work also finds a strong relation between the 
institutional quality and trade flows.
5 De Groot et al. (2004) emphasize furthermore that 
differences in institutional arrangements may hamper trade among countries. In view of this 
literature, measures for institutional quality are included in both steps. Introducing these 
measures reduces the effect of EU membership on trade flows and the effect of openness on 
growth, but does not annihilate these effects. So, there are two relevant channels through which 
the accession countries are likely to benefit from EU membership. First, joining the internal 
market increases their opportunities to trade and raises their growth potential. Second, 
improving their institutions to meet EU requirements has - directly and indirectly - a positive 
impact on their growth potential.  
The empirical results support optimism for the new member states. First, EU membership is 
estimated to increase trade with roughly 56%. The effects for the individual CEE countries vary 
widely. To a large extent this variation depends on a country’s openness in combination with 
the intensity of its trade with the EU and on the quality of the institutions. Second, a one 
percentage point increase in openness, i.e. the ratio of trade to GDP, expands output by about 
0.7% in the long run. Combining the two effects, the new EU members can experience on 
average an increase in their real income of roughly 39% in the long term. These results show 
that EU integration could significantly help in reducing the income gap between new and old 
member states. Relative income in the accession countries could increase from 46 to 63% of the 
EU-15 average. That is a significant decline of the income gap, although much remains to be 
done for closing it.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides estimation results for the 
relation between EU membership on openness. In Section 3 we quantify impacts of openness on 
income. In section 4 we combine the two regression results and estimate effect of accessing the 
EU on output for all the accession countries. Section 5 concludes. 
 
5 See Koukhartchouk and Maurel (2003), de Groot et al. (2004), and Jansen and Nordas (2004).   13 
2  Effects of the EU membership on bilateral trade 
Economic explanations of bilateral trade flows found inspiration in Newton’s physical laws of 
gravity. The gravity model for trade flows appeared in the early 1960s (Tinbergen, 1962), and 
its theoretical foundations were laid down only later on. Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand 
(1985) have shown that the model is compatible with the ‘new’ trade theory as well as with the 
Heckscher-Ohlin framework.  
In the field of economics, the gravity model suggests that trade between two countries will 
increase with their size and decrease with distance between them. Bigger countries have a 
higher potential to export (supply) and import (demand) from their partners. The ‘new’ trade 
theory suggests that trade flow between two countries is higher the more the productivity levels 
in these countries approach each other. Distance is a proxy for transport costs: the larger the 
distance the higher the transport costs. The costs of international transactions may include more 
than just costs of international transport. Usually a set of dummies is included to proxy for other 
ways in which transaction costs may arise. Do countries share a common border? Do they have 
a common language? Do they take part in a same regional trade agreement? In explicit form the 
gravity equation is as follows 








i + + + + + + + = … δ β β β β β   (2.1) 
where Xij is the value of the flow from country i to country j expressed in constant U.S. dollars, 
Yi (Yj) is GDP in i (j) in constant US dollars, Ni (Nj) is the total population in i (j), Dij is the 
distance between the two countries and uij is a normally distributed error term. To capture the 
idea that trade may be relatively intense between similar countries, GDP per capita of the two 
trading partners is included.  
The equation may include any other factors that either aid or resist trade between i and j and 
have similar effect as distance. In particular, a dummy for shared membership is included to see 
what the effect of EU membership is. It is this dummy that is in the centre of our interest. By 
creating an internal market for goods, services and capital the European Union removes various 
explicit and implicit barriers to trade. The expectation is of course the trade is more intense 
when the two trading partners are both EU member. Also included are dummies for 
membership of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the OECD (excluding the 
EU). Since the APEC is free trade area and the OECD not even that, one would expect shared 
EU membership to have a larger effect than shared membership of either APEC or the OECD. 
However, this outcome is not inevitable empirically. Rose (2004) finds that the membership of 
the OECD is associated with larger stimulus to trade than membership of the WTO. 
   14 
Data and estimation 
Data for bilateral trade flows are available for 160 countries in the period 1996-2000. 
Combining these with data for the control variables, yields at most 45712 observations. Missing 
an explicit price deflator for exports, the share of nominal exports in nominal GDP is taken as 
the dependent variable. The data sources are described in appendix B.  
The gravity equation is estimated with weighted least squares, where (log) exports are used 
as weights. Weighing allows for the fact that the thinner the market is the higher is the variance. 
 
The regression equation explains over 50 percent of the variation in the data. The first column 
of Table 2.1 (equation 1) shows that the traditional factors  distance, GDP, and GDP per capita  
are statistically significant and in line with the literature. Since exports are a fraction of GDP, 
the difference between the coefficient for GDP of the exporting country and for GDP of the 
importing country is largely cosmetic.
6 The effects of GDPs per capita are about 0.5, showing 
that rich countries trade more than proportionally with each other. Finally, the estimate for (the 
log of) distance is near -0.82, indicating that 10 percent decrease in distance leads roughly to a 
8.2 percent increase in bilateral trade. Using the same language appears to more than double 
trade. Sharing a border has a smaller but still an important effect.  
The result of interest is, however, the coefficient of the dummy for shared EU membership. 
When the two trading partners are both EU member, trade between the two is higher than usual. 
The estimated coefficient, 0.53, implies that common membership leads to 70% extra trade 
between the two trading partners. Clearly, this is an important effect. This effect is somewhat 
larger than in earlier studies.
7 
Remarkable is, however, that shared membership of APEC has an even larger effect on 
trade. The European Union is much more than a free trade area. For example, it aims to abolish 
non-tariff, technical barriers through mutual recognition or harmonisation of product standards. 
However, the results do not indicate that relatively deep integration within the European boosts 
international trade more than relatively loose integration within free trade area like the APEC. 
The large effect of APEC membership is also found by Frankel and Rose (2002). The effect of 
OECD membership, excluding the EU members, is modest, however (equation 2).
8  In contrast 
to Rose (2004)’s results, our regression has - reassuringly - the outcome that trade-promoting 
institutions indeed promote trade.  
Within the European Union institutional  quality is high. For example, corruption does not 
occur at a large scale, government procedures are fairly transparent and the social-political 
conditions are stable. This level of quality is conducive to international trade. Alternatively, the 
 
6 Exports are expressed as a share of GDP in the origin country. One could thus transfer log GDP in the origin country from 
the left to the right hand side of equation (2.1). Then the values of coefficients for both GDP’s are nearly identical.  
7 Baldwin et al. (1997) as well as Brenton and Gros (1997) find an increase in bilateral trade between EU members of about 
30%. Later studies find larger effects.  Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2003) report a 40% increase in bilateral trade, and Lejour et al. 
(2004) a 50% increase. 
8 Since membership of the APEC and the OECD overlaps considerably, the two dummies are introduced separately into the 
equation.   15 
prospect of EU membership may induce a country to improve its institutions. The accession 
countries have made numerous changes in their legal systems. In any case, one expects that EU 
membership and institutional quality are related. Indeed, columns three and four in Table 2.1 
show that including measures for institutional quality reduces the effect of EU membership. In 
the specification with the dummy for the APEC membership, the coefficient for the EU dummy 
falls from 0.53 to 0.38 (column 1 versus column 3). 
With specification (2.1) EU membership is assumed to have the same relative effect on the 
bilateral trade flows between its member states. A common idea is, however, that mainly small 
and open economies benefit from the European integration of national markets. They may see a 
more than average increase of their trade within the European Union. To allow for this 
possibility, the cross-product of the dummy for shared EU membership and openness of the 
exporter is introduced (where openness is defined as the sum of export and imports as 
percentage of GDP). The coefficients in the fifth and sixth column imply that a small, open 
economy benefits more from European integration than a large, relatively closed economy. The 
average effect of shared EU membership is roughly the same as in the other regressions. 
Notable is, however, the difference between small and large member states. For Belgium with 
an openness of 140% the increase in its intra-EU export is about 110%, whereas for Germany 
with an openness of about 50% the increase is about 25%. 
 
The estimation results give the conclusion that EU membership has a clear, strong effect on 
international trade. Not only lower barriers to trade give rise to increased trade, but also better 
institutions, almost imposed on  new member states, lead to more trade within an expanded 
Union. This concludes the first step. The next section describes the second step, where the 
effects of more trade (and better institutions) on income are estimated.   16 
 
 
Table 2.1         The effect of the EU membership on bilateral trade flows 
Regression  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Constant  − 21.655***  − 22.862***  − 18.950***  − 19.867***  − 21.702***  − 19.020*** 
  [− 133 0]  [− 136.4]  [− 78.4]  [− 78.0]  [− 133.1]  [− 78.5] 
EU dummy  0.527***  0.398***  0.380***  0.246***  0.037  − 0.078 
  [20.5]  [15.0]  [14.3]  [9.0]  [0.7]  [− 1.5] 
EU * openness          0.006***  0.006*** 
          [10.8]  [9.8] 
APEC  1.251***    1.166***    1.177***  1.125*** 
  [40.1]    [36.4]    [24.5]  [23.1] 
APEC * openness          0.001*  0.001 
          [1.8]  [1.0] 
OECD (excluding EU)     0.086**    0.064     
    [2.2]    [1.5]     
Log GDP exporter  − 0.165***  − 0.135***  − 0.146***  − 0.116***  − 0.161***  − 0.143*** 
  [− 38.2]  [− 29.9]  [− 30.9]  [− 23.5]  [− 37.2]  [− 30.1] 
Log GDP importer  0.776***  0.807***  0.793***  0.826***  0.775***  0.793*** 
  [172.3]  [176.9]  [166.1]  [170.9]  [172.2]  [166.0] 
Log GDP per capita exporter  0.504***  0.514***  0.405***  0.403***  0.501***  0.404*** 
  [59.0]  [58.4]  [32.8]  [30.9]  [58.5]  [32.7] 
Log GDP per capita importer  0.499***   0.505***  0.392***  0.390***  0.500***  0.393*** 
  [58.3]  [56.8]  [32.0]  [30.4]  [58.4]  [32.1] 
Log distance  − 0.814***  − 0.816***  − 0.837***  − 0.841***  − 0.812***  − 0.835*** 
  [− 98.2]  [− 95.3]  [− 96.1]  [− 93.0]  [− 97.8]  [− 95.6] 
Common border  0.595***  0.583***  0.591***  0.582***  0.604***  0.599*** 
  [17.2]  [16.4]  [16.7]  [16.0]  [17.4]  [17.0] 
Common language  0.854***  0.938***  0.756***  0.828***  0.852***  0.754*** 
  [36.5]  [40.3]  [30.7]  [33.8]  [36.2]  [30.5] 
Institutional quality exporter      − 0.225***  − 0.249***    − 0.221*** 
      [− 14.5]  [− 14.7]    [− 14.3] 
Institutional quality importer      − 0.243***  − 0.261***    − 0.243*** 
      [− 13.9]  [− 13.9]    [− 14.0] 
             
Weighted R-squared  0.596  0.582  0.568  0.554  0.597  0.569 
             
Observations  45712  45712  41676  41676  45712  41676 
 
Dependent is log export as percentage of GDP of the exporting country 
Heteroskedasticity robust t values are reported between square brackets. . *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level,  
The sample spans the period 1996-2000. Year dummies are included and statistically significant at the 1% level but not reported.   17 
3  Trade and income 
From a theoretical perspective there are good reasons to believe that better possibilities for 
international trade give rise to higher production and productivity. For example, with lower 
barriers to international trade producers and consumers gain better access to specialized 
products. Lower barriers may also foster international competition forcing firms to lower their 
mark-ups and to exploit returns to scale better. Moreover, endogenous growth theories usually 
emphasize the dynamic gains of increased openness: via international exchange of goods and 
through  international contacts firms are able to tap foreign knowledge and ideas which help 
them to speed up the pace of  innovation.  
Indeed, the bulk of recent empirical research supports the link from openness to growth. A 
run-of-the mill specification takes the growth rate or the income level as a dependent variable 
and a measure of openness together with other neoclassical growth variables as independent 
variables. The most widely used variable – which we will also use in our analysis   is the ratio 
of trade to GDP. Usually this ratio is found to have a positive and significant effect on growth.
9  
Various aspects of the empirical approach to trade and growth have generated discussion in 
the literature. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2003) put into doubt whether the empirical outcomes are 
robust: changes in the sample of countries or in the estimation form can easily lead to important 
changes in the estimation results. How compelling this argument is, is not clear. First of all, it 
seems true for most multi-country, multi-period estimations. Second, a study that comes up with 
a negative relation between trade and income (growth) is hard to find. Edwards (1998) uses nine 
indicators for openness and two regression methods and concludes that in all cases, except one, 
the coefficient has the expected sign. In thirteen cases the coefficient is statistically significant.   
Alesina et al. (2003) conclude therefore that  the range of possible effects is bounded below by 
zero. For this and other reasons, most economists tend to assume a positive effect of trade on 
income.  
Robust or not, the outcomes can be given different interpretations: the causality may run 
either direction. To correct for simultaneity, Frankel and Romer (1999) use geographic 
characteristics such as distance, common borders and common language as instrumental 
variables. In this way they hope to obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of trade on income. 
They find that trade has a robust, positive, large effect on income. In fact, correcting for 
simultaneity leads to larger coefficients. Irwin and Terviö (2000) support these findings for an 
extended sample period. According to both studies estimations using instrumental variables 
(IV) lead to higher coefficients than estimations using ordinary least squares (OLS). 
This paper is not intended to discuss empirical problems at great length and to deal with 
them. Instead, the aim is more modest and rather practical: what do the usual estimations imply 
for the (dynamic) benefits of EU membership? This section reports a rather common growth 
regression, from which we derive the empirical estimate for the effect of trade on income. The 
 
9 Good surveys of literature are Dollar (1992) and Edwards (1993), but also Srinivasan and Wallack (2004).   18 
estimate is rather conservative. First, the regression equation is estimated with OLS and not 
with IV (see above). Second, the equation does not take into account that better possibilities for 
international trade may lead to higher income by stimulating investment in physical and human 
capital. Instead, the regression yields only an estimate for the direct effect of trade on income. 
 
Following Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), a classical Solow growth equation is estimated, 
where income (growth) is related to initial income and accumulation of physical and human 
capital. The investment in human capital takes several forms: population growth, enrolment in 
primary education and enrolment in secondary education. Added to this equation is a measure 
for openness. More specifically, openness is defined as the value of import and exports as a 
ratio of GDP. A positive effect of openness on income in combination with higher openness for 
smaller economies would imply that breaking up a larger economy into smaller ones will boost 
income on aggregate. This overlooks, among other things, economies of scale, which  larger 
economies may enjoy. To allow for a non-linear relation between country size and income, the 
growth equation included openness in quadratic form as well as the population size.  
We use a panel covering the period 1960-2000 which we divide it into eight five-year 
intervals. The variables are averaged over these intervals. The exception is initial income, which 
is given the value at the beginning of each five-year period. The random error term uit is less 
influenced by business cycle fluctuations and less likely to be serially correlated than it would 
be with yearly data. 
The specification slightly differs from Frankel and Rose (2002). First, we have replaced 
GDP per capita at the beginning of the sample period with GDP per capita in the first year of 
every five-year period following Islam (1995).  Second,, we have included openness in 
quadratic form as well as population size. Edwards (1998) also includes quadratic terms for 
openness indicators to test for nonlinearities between openness and growth. In some cases the 
coefficient is significant, indicating that the effect of openness on growth peters out. This is 
plausible: one of the reasons why openness should have a positive effect on income is the 
exploitation to economies of scale. Alesina et al. (2003) show empirically that the effect of 
openness on growth is larger for small countries than for large countries. Small countries need  
foreign markets in order to benefit from scale effects. This is in particular relevant for smaller 
countries, such as most of  the CEE countries. However, if these countries are well integrated 
with international markets and already exploit their economies of scale, one could expect that 
further increases in openness contribute less to income. 
 
Table 3.1 presents the estimation results. In the first column the traditional controls of the 
neoclassical growth model turn out, with an exception of the enrolment in primary education 
and population growth, to be statistically significant. It is not uncommon for proxies for human 
capital to have a statistically insignificant effect. This is also the case in the study by Frankel 
and Rose. This finding is reminiscent of a claim of Easterly (2001) that it is not education per se   19 
that contributes to economic growth but rather general knowledge that can be acquired in 
different ways.  
Table 3.1  Effect of openness and EU membership on GDP/capita 
Regression  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Openness  0.060**  0.059*  0.070**  0.036 
  [2.01]  [1.95]  [2.41]  [1.21] 
Openness^2  − 0.010  − 0.009  − 0.016*  − 0.003 
  [− 1.02]  [− 0.99]  [− 1.76]  [− 0.30] 
Population (log)  0.007*  0.007*  0.008**  0.002 
  [1.92]  [1.83]  [2.36]  [0.67] 
Initial income  (log)  0.954***  0.953***  0.944***  0.933*** 
  [105.10]  [104.02]  [100.49]  [82.44] 
Investment rate  (log)  0.007***  0.007***  0.007***  0.005*** 
  [9.47]  [9.42]  [9.49]  [6.90] 
Population growth   − 0.460  − 0.446  − 0.304  0.091 
  [− 0.50]  [− 0.47]  [− 0.34]  [0.10] 
Enrolment primary education  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001** 
  [1.30]  [1.30]  [0.72]  [2.22] 
Enrolment secondary education  0.001**  0.001**  0.001  0.001** 
  [2.04]  [2.01]  [1.41]  [2.27] 
EU dummy    0.002     
    [0.14]     
Institutional quality      − 0.034***   
      [− 3.14]   
South Asia        − 0.070*** 
        [− 3.09] 
East Asia & Pacific        − 0.036* 
        [1.79] 
Sub-Saharan Africa        − 0.104*** 
        [− 4.90] 
Latin America        − 0.068*** 
        [− 4.43] 
Constant  0.234**  0.236**  0.401  0.504 
  [2.37]  [2.38]  [3.73]  [4.58] 
         
R^2  0.987  0.987  0.987  0.988 
Countries   96   96   96   96 
Observations   720   720   720   720 
         
Dependent variable is the logarithm of real GDP per capita. Openness is the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. 
Indicator for institutional quality is an overall score of countries in Heritage index.  
In our regressions we use eight 5-year periods spanning from 1960 till 2000. Initial GDP per capita refers to GDP per capita at the 
beginning of each five-year period. 
Heteroskedasticity robust student t values are reported between square brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level.  
   20 
We focus on the coefficient of openness. As we have mentioned above, the openness variable 
may affect accumulation. We are aware that induced factor accumulation will not be attributed 
to changes in openness in our specification, leading to a downward biased coefficient. In the 
first regression we find that a one percentage point increase in openness leads
10  to about 0.98% 
higher income in the long run. This long-term effect equals the estimated effect of Frankel and 
Rose (2002, see table II). According to them, income increases with 1.14% in the long run when 
the ratio of exports and imports to GDP increases with one percentage point. Note that these 
effects are substantially lower than the coefficient of 2 found by Romer and Weil (1999) who 
correct for possible simultaneity between trade and income using an IV estimator. The 
coefficient of 2 is large, but also Edwards (1998) finds for most of his openness indicators 
higher coefficients if these are estimated with IV than if these are estimated with weighted least 
squares. 
 
We are also interested in evidence that membership in the EU delivers positive income effects 
via other routes than trade. For example, joining the Union may lead to reduction in uncertainty, 
stimulating investment. To check this we include a dummy for EU membership. The results in 
the second column show that the coefficient is positive, but insignificantly different from zero. 
Including a dummy does not yield convincing evidence for economic benefits from EU 
membership.  
The third column of Table 3.1 underlines that institutions do indeed matter for economic 
performance of countries.
11  It also shows that including a measure for institutional quality in 
the regression equation changes the coefficient for openness. The long-run effect remains nearly 
the same for average openness: it changes from 0.98% to 1.02%. Besides, the quadratic term 
becomes statistically significant. Combined with a positive coefficient for population size, this 
suggests that country size does not have an unequivocal effect. The results in the third column 
are not sensitive to a choice of a measure of institutional quality. We have tried individual 
indicators from the Heritage database as well as governance indicators provided by Kaufman et 
al. (2003) and found that indeed the coefficients remain statistically significant from zero and 
keep more or less the same value (see appendix A).  
The results in the fourth column appear when a set of regional dummies is included in the 
regression equation. A number of economists have pointed out that location may play a 
principal role in development. For example, Bloom and Sachs (1998) and Sachs (2001) argue 
that tropical locations are associated with underdevelopment. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001) suggest that the location is decisive which type of (colonial) institutions has been 
developed. Yet others stress that geographical location has had a direct effect on technological 
 
10 For an average value for openness of 69.1% 
11 As a measure of institutional quality we use the Heritage total score which comprises a number of indicators of institutional 
climate for the period 1995-2003. For our purposes we average the data over the available time span; in other words we 
assume that institutions will not change over time.  The index takes values from one to five, with higher marks indicating 
worse institutions.   21 
development of societies (Diamond, 1997). To allow for location, at least to some degree, 
regional dummies are included. This has an effect on the coefficients for openness and their 
standard deviations. Neither of the two terms is statistically significant. When, however, the 
quadratic term is dropped from the equation, the linear term is statistically significant. 
Not shown are regression results where openness is allowed to have a different effect at 
different stages of development. The results agree with the belief of many economists that 
especially at the initial stages of development trade can significantly contribute to the economic 
situation of countries.
12  What is striking, however, is that the short-run effect of openness on 
income for upper-middle income countries – where most of CEEs belong to – is three times 
higher than for the overall sample. For the long-run effect the difference is much smaller.  
 
The estimation results show openness has clear and important effect on income. When a 
measure for institutional quality is included, this effect becomes smaller but remains significant. 
The EU membership can contribute to income (growth) of a new member state in (at least) two 
ways: by improving institutions in the new member states and by stimulating trade between the 
new and the other member states. In the next section this second step is combined with the first 
step to calculate the implied (dynamic) benefits of EU membership. 
 
12 The coefficients for the high income countries are generally lower than for other country groups (with an exception of 
lower-middle income countries.   22   23 
4  The effects of EU membership on income 
We use the results of the two previous sections to calculate the implied effect of EU 
membership on trade and GDP for the new EU members and three candidate members. The 
effect applies to the long run and will not materialize fully in the first years after accession. We 
calculate these effects for the ten countries that have entered the EU in 2004, and for the 
candidate members: Bulgaria, Rumania and Turkey. The results are presented in Table 4.1 and 
Table 4.2. 
To calculate the effect on trade we use the results in the third column of Table 2.1. In this 
specification a measure for institutional quality is included, lowering the estimated direct effect 
of EU membership on trade. Membership has a direct effect as well as an indirect effect, when 
it forces entrants to adjust their institutions towards the average EU level. The coefficient for 
the EU dummy is 0.38 and the coefficients for the level of institutions in the exporting and 
importing country are 0.225 and 0.243, respectively.   
The first three columns in Table 4.1 show the situation before the accession. The first 
column provides a country’s trade share within the EU28 and the second a country’s ratio of 
trade (sum of exports and imports) to GDP. Clear is that the geographical position within the 
EU28 matters for a country’s trade with the other (candidate) member states. For example, the 
Baltic states are at the periphery of the EU and their trade with other member states is relatively 
low. Clear is also that a large country like Poland is less open than a small country like Malta. 
The third column shows the measure for institutional quality. According to the Heritage index, 
the average level in the EU15 is equal to 2.2 in the year 2000. Note that a higher value 
corresponds with less institutional quality. The Czech republic and Estonia are the two countries 
that have already reached that level. The others have a lower quality of institutions according to 
the Heritage index and are assumed to see an improvement in the quality as a part of EU 
membership. This assumption is to illustrate the consequences of such an improvement. It is not 
necessarily realistic. The dispersion within the EU15 is large, ranging from 2.7 in Greece to 1.7 
in Ireland. It can take decades before countries reach that level of institutional quality. 
Institutions are often rooted in  the country-specific culture and cultural differences might be 
structural. 
The last three columns present the effect of EU membership on a country’s trade. The fourth 
column gives the direct effect. It is the product of three terms: the coefficient of the EU dummy 
in the gravity equation, the share of trade with the EU28 and the ratio of total trade to GDP. For 
example, for the Czech Republic the direct effect is an increase of 49.4% ( =(e
0.38 – 
1)*123.8*86.3/100). The fifth column shows the indirect effect on a country’s trade when the 
quality of its institutions converges towards the average level in the EU15. For some countries, 
like Malta and Slovakia, the indirect effect is at least as important as the direct effect.  
Overall, EU membership is calculated to raise trade of the 10 countries with 55.6% and 
trade of the 13 countries with 49.5%. The direct trade effect is larger than the indirect effect   24 
through institutions, but for the three candidate countries the indirect effects are relatively more 
important.  
There are important differences among the countries. While for the Malta the potential 
increase in its openness is more than 120%, Poland is implied to see an increase of about 40%, 
and Turkey is calculated to see an increase with only 30%. A small country like Malta is much 
more open than a large country like Poland or Turkey. The small country can expect a larger 
absolute change in openness than the large country, but the relative change for both small and 
large countries is roughly the same. 
Table 4.1       Effect of the EU Membership on Openness  
    Initial situation  Change in openness as result of EU membership 
             
Country  EU28 trade  
(% of total) 
Total trade 





Via institutions  
on openness 
Total effect  
on openness 
             
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6=4+5) 
             
Cyprus  56.0  99.5  2.55  25.8  17.0  42.7 
Czech Republic  86.3  123.8  2.20  49.4  0.0  49.4 
Estonia  77.4  164.7  2.20  58.9  0.0  58.9 
Hungary  80.6  101.8  2.55  37.9  17.4  55.3 
Latvia  67.2  106.9  2.65  33.2  23.7  56.9 
Lithuania  68.6  105.8  2.90  33.5  37.6  71.2 
Malta  62.5  182.5  2.95  52.7  70.0  122.7 
Poland  80.8  59.0  2.80  22.0  17.8  39.8 
Slovakia  85.6  131.8  3.00  52.1  54.2  106.4 
Slovenia  82.4  114.8  3.00  43.7  47.2  90.9 
             
Accession 10: 
weighted average  79.8  91.7  2.68  33.8  21.8  55.6 
             
Bulgaria  71.7  110.9  3.40  36.7  71.9  108.6 
Romania  77.9  64.4  3.30  23.2  37.8  61.0 
Turkey  66.1  52.3  2.75  16.0  14.4  30.3 
             
Accession 13: 
weighted average  75.4  77.0  2.79  26.8  22.7  49.5 
 
EU28 trade share is a proportion of trade of accession countries with the EU and other accession countries. It is averaged over the 
period 1996-2000. Trade (exports and imports) as ratio of GDP is taken from the Penn World Tables 6.1 and is also averaged over the 
period 1996-2000. Average GDP is used for the weights in the averages for accession 10 and 13.  
 
We have done similar calculations on basis of the regression results in the fifth column of Table 
2.1 in which the effect of EU membership depends in a non-linear way on openness. The 
conclusion is that relatively open, small countries benefit to a larger extent from membership 
than relatively closed, large countries. The average effect for the ten new EU members remains 
the same. The variation across the countries is, however, much larger and reflects the large   25 
variation in openness. The trade effects of EU membership for the candidate countries are on 
average smaller because these countries are not as open as the ten new member states.
13 
 
After taking the step to calculate the implied effect of EU membership on trade, the next step is 
to derive from the income (growth) regression the implied effect on GDP in the new and 
candidate member states.  Table 4.2 presents the results using the estimation results in the third 
column of Table 3.1. In this specification EU membership can contribute to income by 
increasing openness and by improving institutional quality (to the average in the EU15). Indeed, 
the direct effect is insignificant; only the indirect effects, through trade expansion and through 
institutional change, seem to matter. Note that the effect of more openness depends on the level 
of openness itself:  this effect is non-linear. Comparing the first two columns in Table 4.2 
makes that clear. The first column reproduces the effect of EU membership on openness (= 
column (6) in table 4.1) , whereas the second column presents the effect of openness on income. 
The Czech Republic and Slovakia illustrate that for countries with similar initial trade patterns, 
see columns (1) and (2) in Table 4.1, more openness is usually associated with more income. 
Since the trade effect for Slovakia is twice as large as for the Czech Republic, the income effect 
is also larger. The income effect, however, is not twice as large (the non linearity).  The case of 
the small and extremely open economy of Malta shows, however, that the income effect of 
more openness is sometimes small. The effect of openness on income is non-linear and 
becomes negligible for high values of openness. Indeed, Malta’s openness (180%) deviates 
strongly from the average in the sample (69%). The case of Malta thus underlines that small 
countries may not expect a (much) larger trade-related bonus than large countries. For most of 
the accession countries the trade-related income effects have the same order of magnitude. 
 
Comparing the results in columns 2 and 3 reveals that the effect through trade is much more 
important than the direct effect through institutional change on income. This must not be taken 
to mean that institutional change is unimportant. The regressions imply that improvements in 
domestic institutions have important income effects, but also that these improvements work (to 
raise income) through an increase in exports and imports. 
On average, the income in the ten new member states is calculated to increase with 39% in the 
long-run. From the candidate countries, especially, Bulgaria and Romania are projected to 
benefit.  The outcome is thus a significant effect of EU membership on domestic GDP. It 
indicates that CGE analyses underestimate the (dynamic) effects of economic integration. The 
GDP effect is in our calculations about five times larger than the largest effect from the static 
CGE analyses. The outcome also indicates that EU integration could really help the CEE 
countries to catch up to the average level in the EU. For the 10 accession countries relative 
income is 45% of the average in the EU15 (World Bank, 2003). That could increase to about 
 
13 These results are not presented here, but available upon request by the authors.   26 
63%. This is a substantial catching-up effect, though not enough to close the income gap 
between new and old member states completely.
14 
Table 4.2          Effect of EU membership on income (change in GDP as % of initial GDP) 
Country  Effect on openness 
(see Table 4.1) 
Effect of openness 
on income 




         
Cyprus  42.7  28.6  1.1  29.1 
Czech Republic  49.4  26.2  0.0  26.2 
Estonia  58.9  18.0  0.0  18.0 
Hungary  55.3  34.6  1.1  35.7 
Latvia  56.9  34.0  1.4  35.3 
Lithuania  71.2  40.3  2.1  42.5 
Malta  122.7  7.2  2.3  9.5 
Poland  39.8  34.9  1.8  36.7 
Slovakia  106.4  37.3  2.4  39.7 
Slovenia  90.9  43.0  2.4  45.4 
         
Average for accession 10:   55.6  37.5  1.5  39.0 
         
Bulgaria  108.6  48.7  3.7  52.4 
Romania  61.0  48.6  3.4  52.0 
Turkey  30.3  28.3  1.7  30.0 
         
Average for accession 13:  49.5  37.8  1.8  39.6 
 
The income effect of 37.5% due to a trade increase of 56% implies that the long-run effect of 
1% point extra openness on income is about 0.7. This is smaller than the estimated effect in 
section 3 of about 1.0% for the average openness of the countries in the sample. The reason is 
that the relation between openness and income growth is nonlinear: the average openness of the 
ten new member states is some 20 percentage points higher than the one of the total sample.  
Discussion  
Combining the two regression equations produces the result that accession is expected to have 
an important effect on production and income in the new member states. The implied, estimated 
increase in income is about 39%, which is much larger than the predicted increase by general 
equilibrium models. The question is whether the estimated increase in income is plausible and 
robust?  
One point of doubt is that the regression equations do not identify structural relations. The 
causality may run in either direction. For example, better possibilities to trade may lead to an 
 
14 There is one caveat in these calculations. The GDP increase is based on GDP level measured in constant prices. The 
comparison of income per capita in PPP terms measures GDP in ppp prices. It can be expected that if GDP increases the 
lower purchase power prices converge somewhat to the price level in the EU. So the new member states become relatively 
more expensive in time. This will reduce the relative increase in income per capita somewhat.   27 
increase in income but, on the other hand, a higher income may allow governments to reduce 
barriers to trade. However, the results from structural estimation seem to imply even larger 
effects from trade on income (Frankel and Romer, 1999). This suggests that the regressions in 
this paper underestimate, rather than overestimate, the income effect through international trade. 
Perhaps the uncertainty about the effects of EU membership is not so much that it increases 
income but how it increases income. In the literature there is a debate about the relative 
significance of three broad factors behind economic performance: trade, location and 
institutions. Unfortunately, identifying the structural relations between economic performance 
and either of these factors is not easy, to put it mildly. Finding good instruments is rather 
difficult. As a result, the debate does not seem to converge to a consensus.  
Accepting that is it is difficult to tell whether lower barriers to trade or a better quality of 
institutions are behind the economic benefits from EU membership, we want to argue that the 
implied total effect in income in the new member states is plausible. There are two pieces of 
relevant evidence. First, we consider the economic performance of Greece, Portugal and Spain 
after their entry in the Union. Second, we consider the implications from regression equation 
that links total factor productivity (TFP) to expenditure on research and development (R&D).  
First, Table 4.3 shows the income per capita in Greece, Portugal and Spain in 1986 and in 
2001, relative to the average for the EU-15. Since its accession (in 1981) Greece has not 
succeeded in increasing its relative income. In fact, between 1986 and 1995 its relative income 
has even declined to 65%. The experience for Portugal and Spain is more encouraging. They 
have been able to raise their relative income with about 10 to 14 percentage points in the 15 
years after accession. Although it is not clear that the increase in period 1986- 2001 represents 
already the long-term effect, the numbers suggest that accession contributes significantly to 
catching up. One has to keep in mind that at the accession date both countries were much closer 
to the EU-15 average than the newest member states. 
Table 4.3  Catching-up of other EU countries 
Income per capita as % of EU-15 in ppp terms   1986  2001  Relative increase  
1986-2001 
       
Greece  74.6  72.4  − 2.9% 
Spain  74.2  83.6  12.7% 
Portugal  61.5  75.3  22.4% 
 
Source: World Bank (2003), and own calculations. 
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Second, what is the effect of trade on total factor productivity? Coe and Helpman (1995), and 
Coe, Helpman, and Hofmaister (1997) find empirical evidence for the familiar idea that trade in 
goods and services helps the exchange of ideas and technologies leading to improvements in 
productivity. In the regressions the stock of foreign knowledge investment (i.e. expenditure on 
R&D) has an effect on domestic TFP. This effect also depends on openness; the more open an 
economy is, the more it benefits from the stock of foreign knowledge. We have taken the 
estimation results from Coe et al. (1997) to calculate the implied effect of trade on TFP: for the 
thirteen  new and candidate member states,  the 49.5% increase in openness leads to a TFP 
increase of  7.5%. The effect on production is larger than the effect on TFP. The reason is that 
the capital stock will adjust. With a constant rate of return on capital the capital stock will grow 
at the same rate as production. This assumption and a capital share in total costs of 1/3 imply 
that the effect on production is a factor one and a half larger than the effect on TFP. Assuming a 
larger capital share gives  larger factor. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) find that the observed 
pace of convergence implies a capital share of 2/3 (including human capital), leading to a factor 
three. In the latter case, production increases by about 20% (3*7.5%) due to the trade-related 
R&D spillovers. This explains about 50% of income growth in the new and candidate member 
states. With either factor, the effect on production through the combination of R&D and 
openness is substantial. However, even with a factor three, the effect is not as large as the 
implied effect of our estimations. But this is not surprising. R&D is only a part of the story. 
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5  Conclusions 
In the present paper we have quantified potential impacts – both static and dynamic - of the EU 
membership on the new members. We find that joining the EU can increase the trade up from 
34% to 56%. The lower number reflects the direct effect of membership on trade, and the upper 
number also includes the indirect effects through changes in the economic institutions. 
Moreover we estimate that increasing the openness of a country by 1 percentage point can yield 
0.7% higher income in the long run given the openness of the new member states. Combining 
the two results we calculate that the new member states can on average count on an 
improvement of their incomes to 39% percent in the long term. These gains vary among the 
countries depending on how strong is their trading relationship with the current and future 
member states as well as on the openness of their economies. However the size of these effects 
is not a reason for celebration. In the current situation, where the income of the new member 
states is about 45% of the EU average in purchase power terms, it will take a few generations 
before accession countries get anywhere close to the EU standard. This is certainly the case for 
countries like Poland and the Baltic States and is also true for the other candidates of EU 
membership: Bulgaria, Rumania, and Turkey. 
Our estimates are higher than those appearing in the literature. Most of the CGE simulations 
show GDP gains between the 1.5% and 7.8%. In general these simulations do not take account 
of the dynamic effect of economic integration. Our assessment shows that these dynamic effects 
are essential in evaluating the macro-economic effects of EU accession.   30   31 
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Appendix A: Additional Results 
Effect of openness on GDP per capita (various measures of institutional quality 
Heritage indicators  Money  Fdi  Finance  Property  Regulation  Bm 
             
Openness  0.055*  0.061**  0.061**  0.060**  0.070**  0.061 
  [1.830]  [2.040]  [2.050]  [2.060]  [2.490]  [2.110]* 
Openness^2  − 0.009  − 0.010  − 0.011  − 0.012  − 0.019**  − 0.012 
  [− 0.910]  [− 1.090]  [− 1.120]  [− 1.271]  [− 2.294]  [− 1.346] 
Institutions  − 0.013***  -0.003  − 0.010  − 0.026*  − 0.043***  − 0.025*** 
  [− 2.948]  [− 0.438]  [− 1.614]  [− 3.523]  [− 5.351]  [− 4.472] 
             
R-squared  0.987  0.987  0.987  0.987  0.987  0.987 
             
Kaufman indicators  voice  stability  effective  regquality  law  corrupt 
             
Openness  0.070**  0.061**  0.073**  0.075***  0.072**  0.084*** 
  [2.290]  [2.080]  [2.540]  [2.590]  [2.490]  [2.880] 
Openness^2  − 0.010  − 0.011  − 0.018**  − 0.018**  − 0.015*  − 0.018** 
  [− 1.054]  [− 1.160]  [− 2.015]  [− 1.991]  [− 1.651]  [− 2.020] 
Institutions  0.028**  0.033***  0.062***  0.053***  0.057***  0.048*** 
  [2.458]  [4.051]  [7.279]  [5.005]  [6.593]  [6.046] 
             
R-squared  0.987  0.987  0.988  0.987  0.988  0.987 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: Log Real GDP/capita. Additional Independent variables: log population; log initial GDP/capita, 
investment/GDP ratio. population growth, enrolments rates primary and secondary schooling, constant. 
 
Heteroskedasticity robust student t values are reported between square brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level,  
 
Openness = (exports + imports)/GDP. Initial GDP/capita refers to GDP/capita at the beginning of each period. 
 
In our regressions we use eight 5-year periods spanning from 1960 till 2000. 
 
Numbers of observations is 720, 96 countries are included. 
 
Heritage and Kaufman indicators 
Heritage indicators  Kaufman indicators   
 
Money – Monetary policy 
Fdi – Foreign Direct Investment 
Finance – Banking and Finance 
Property – Property Rights 
Regulation – Regulation 
Bm – Black Market 
Voice – Voice and Accountability 
Stability – Political Stability 
Effective – Government Effectiveness 
Regquality – Regulatory Quality 
Law – Rule of Law 
Corrupt – Control of Corruption 
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Appendix B: Data Sets 
In our paper we use two different data sets. The first one is to estimate the bilateral trade in the 
gravity model and thus quantify the effect of the EU membership on trade. With the second set 
we assess the impact of openness on per capita income.  
The (full) trade set consists of 45.712 observations for which the following variables are 
available: bilateral trade. distance. GDP and GDP/capita of both exporter and the trade partner 
and dummies on EU membership. common border and language. and membership to one of the 
regional trade agreements. For a restricted data set which includes 34.592 observations a 
number of additional variables is available. They include number of landlocked countries. 
product of land areas of trade partners. and three political dummy variables: common colonizer. 
ex-colony/colonizer. and political union. These were taken from Frankel and Rose (2002). 
Trade data were obtained from PC-TAS (Personal Computer Trade Analysis System) CD-ROM 
of the International Trade Center UNCTAD/WTO which is derived from the trade database of 
United Nations Statistics Division COMTRADE. We use data from Penn World Table (PWT) 
6.1 for population and real GDP per capita. Distance and dummies on contiguity and language 
come from database of Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales 
(CEPII). Regional agreements are separated into four dummies: EU. APEC and FTA. The latter 
includes membership in trade enhancing agreements: Canada-US FTA. ANDEAN. CACM. 
MERCOSUR. GR3. LAIA. CARICOM. ASEAN. CBI. EAC. EMCCA. ECOWAS. COMESA. 
IOC. SADC. ECWA. WAEMU. SACU. ECCGL. GCC. and SAARC. The institutional 
indicators are taken from the Index of Economic Freedom issued by Heritage Foundation. 
The second data set includes a panel of 96 countries and covers the period 1960-2000 in five 
year spans. The total sample consists of 716 observations. GDP per head. openness. 
investments. and population are taken from Penn World Table (PWT) 6.1. The proxy for human 
capital – total years of schooling come from Barro-Lee data set which encompasses educational 
attainment of population for 138 countries. Indicators of institutional quality are taken from two 
sources: The Index of Economic Freedom of the Heritage Foundation and Kaufman et al. 
(2003). The regional dummy variables have been produced on the basis of World Bank 
classification.   38 




































Congo. Dem. Rep. (r) 
Costa Rica (r) 








Dominican Rep. (r) 
Ecuador (r) 
Egypt (r) 
El Salvador (r) 










































































Saint Kitts and Nevis (r) 
Saint Lucia (r) 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines (r) 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Saudi Arabia (r) 
Senegal (r) 
Seychelles (r) 
Sierra Leone (r) 
Singapore (r) 
Slovenia 
South Africa (r) 
Spain (r) 
















United Kingdom (r) 









NB: All of the listed countries are used in the full sample, while only those succeeded by ‘(r)’ 
are included in the restricted sample.   40 
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Countries are grouped according to income classification provided by the World Bank. 
Abbreviations in the parentheses refer to regional classification by the World Bank which is 
used to create region dummies in Table II. 
•  SAS – South Asia 
•  EAP – East Asia and Pacific 
•  SSA – Sub-Saharan Africa 
•  LAC – Latin America and Caribbean   42 
 